flowchart LR L[Latent<br/>Conditions present] --> P[Perceived<br/>Awareness] P --> F[Felt<br/>Emotional charge] F --> M[Manifest<br/>Behavioural expression] M --> A[Aftermath<br/>Resolution or residue] A -. May feed .-> L style L fill:#FFEBEE,stroke:#C62828 style P fill:#FFF8E1,stroke:#F9A825 style F fill:#FFE0B2,stroke:#E65100 style M fill:#FCE4EC,stroke:#AD1457 style A fill:#E8F5E9,stroke:#2E7D32
25 Conflict, Cooperation and Bipartism
The previous chapter framed industrial relations as a system of cooperation and conflict between workers, employers and the state. This chapter takes the two halves seriously — the dynamics of conflict and how it manifests, the conditions that make cooperation possible, and the institutional arrangement called bipartism through which the two parties most directly resolve their differences.
25.1 Conflict in Industrial Relations
25.1.1 What is Conflict?
Conflict is a process that begins when one party perceives that another party has negatively affected, or is about to negatively affect, something the first party cares about — Robbins’s working definition (robbins2018ob?). In IR, conflict typically involves competing claims on the firm’s resources, decisions, or status.
Pluralist IR (chapter 24) treats conflict as normal; the question is not whether conflict will arise but how it is expressed and whether it is resolved constructively.
25.1.2 Functional vs Dysfunctional Conflict
Modern OB distinguishes two faces of conflict.
TipFunctional vs Dysfunctional Conflict
| Type | Effect on the group | Working signs |
|---|---|---|
| Functional / constructive | Improves group performance, supports goals | Task focus, idea generation, learning |
| Dysfunctional / destructive | Hinders group performance | Personal attacks, hostility, disengagement |
Robbins distinguishes three sub-types of conflict by content: task conflict (about content of work), relationship conflict (interpersonal incompatibilities), and process conflict (about how work gets done). Task conflict at moderate levels is generally functional; relationship conflict is usually dysfunctional; process conflict is functional only at low levels.
25.1.3 Levels of Conflict
TipFive Levels of Conflict
| Level | What is at stake |
|---|---|
| Intra-individual | Within a single person — role conflict, ethical dilemma, choice between alternatives |
| Inter-personal / inter-individual | Between two people |
| Intra-group | Within a team or department |
| Inter-group | Between teams, departments, unions and management |
| Inter-organisational | Between firms, between firms and external parties (regulator, community) |
In IR, inter-group conflict between unions and management dominates. But the others matter too — a poorly handled intra-group fight in a senior team can spill into the IR domain quickly.
25.1.4 Causes of Industrial Conflict
Indian IR textbooks group the causes into six families.
TipSix Families of Causes of Industrial Conflict
| Family | Examples |
|---|---|
| Economic | Wages, bonus, allowances, fringe benefits, hours, retrenchment |
| Managerial | Autocratic supervision, communication failure, refusal to recognise unions, victimisation |
| Government | Unfavourable legislation, delayed adjudication, inconsistent policy |
| Psychological | Lack of recognition, denial of identity, poor leadership, perceived injustice |
| Political | Politicisation of unions, rivalry between political parties, electoral cycles |
| Technological | Automation, plant modernisation, redundancy, changes in skill requirements |
The first and last families — economic and technological — produce the most disputes. The middle families often turn an economic dispute into a prolonged one.
25.1.5 Pondy’s Stages of Conflict
Louis Pondy’s 1967 process model remains the standard framework for tracing how conflict develops (pondy1967?).
TipPondy’s Five Stages of Conflict
| Stage | What happens |
|---|---|
| Latent conflict | Underlying conditions for conflict exist — scarcity, role ambiguity, dependence |
| Perceived conflict | At least one party becomes aware of the conditions |
| Felt conflict | The conflict becomes emotionally charged — anxiety, frustration, hostility |
| Manifest conflict | Behaviour expresses the conflict — argument, strike, withdrawal |
| Conflict aftermath | Resolution settles the dispute or sows seeds for the next round |
The model’s value is its insistence that aftermath matters as much as resolution. A grudgingly settled dispute often becomes the latent stage of the next.
25.1.6 Forms of Manifest Conflict
TipCommon Forms of Industrial Conflict
| Form | What workers / unions do |
|---|---|
| Strike | Concerted refusal to work — covered in chapter 33 |
| Lockout | Employer’s counterpart — closing the workplace to workers |
| Go-slow | Working at a deliberately reduced pace |
| Work-to-rule | Performing only the strict letter of the rule book; a deniable slowdown |
| Gherao | Surrounding the manager to prevent her from leaving — distinctive Indian form |
| Boycott | Refusing to use, buy or handle a product or service |
| Picketing | Posting workers at the plant gate to discourage entry |
| Sabotage | Damaging equipment, output or reputation |
| Absenteeism, turnover, withdrawal | Covert, individual-level expression of conflict |
The legal status of each form varies — strike under conditions is protected; lockouts, sabotage, gherao and certain forms of picketing have specific legal regimes (see chapters 33 and 35).
25.1.7 Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Modes
Beyond IR-specific forms, the Thomas-Kilmann instrument identifies five general styles of handling interpersonal conflict, plotting a person on two axes — concern for self (assertiveness) and concern for the other (cooperativeness) (thomas1976?).
TipThomas-Kilmann’s Five Conflict-Handling Modes
| Mode | Assertiveness | Cooperativeness | When useful |
|---|---|---|---|
| Competing | High | Low | Quick decisive action; unpopular but right decisions |
| Collaborating | High | High | Important issues where both parties’ concerns matter |
| Compromising | Medium | Medium | Temporary settlements; equal-power parties; time pressure |
| Avoiding | Low | Low | Trivial issues; cooling-off; gathering information |
| Accommodating | Low | High | When the issue matters more to the other; preserving harmony |
The skilled IR practitioner uses all five — collaborating where possible, compromising where necessary, the others sparingly.
25.1.8 Constructive Conflict Resolution
The classical resolution menu has five entries.
TipFive Approaches to Conflict Resolution
| Approach | What it involves |
|---|---|
| Negotiation | Direct bargaining between the parties |
| Conciliation | A third party helps the parties reach their own agreement |
| Mediation | More active third-party involvement, with proposed terms |
| Arbitration | Third party decides the issue (binding or non-binding) |
| Adjudication | Statutory tribunal decides; legally binding |
Industrial-relations law in India provides a structured cascade of these mechanisms (chapter 32).
25.1.9 Walton-McKersie Behavioural Theory of Negotiation
Richard Walton and Robert McKersie’s A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (1965) is the standard reference. They distinguish four sub-processes operating simultaneously in any labour negotiation (walton1965?).
TipWalton-McKersie’s Four Sub-Processes of Bargaining
| Sub-process | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Distributive bargaining | Win-lose splitting of a fixed pie — wages, bonus |
| Integrative bargaining | Win-win expansion of the pie — productivity, training, safety |
| Attitudinal structuring | Shaping the relationship between parties — trust, hostility |
| Intra-organisational bargaining | Within each side, between sub-groups (e.g. union leadership and rank-and-file) |
A skilled negotiator manages all four at once. Distributive bargaining alone produces a settlement but rarely a relationship; integrative bargaining without attitudinal structuring rarely sticks.
25.2 Cooperation in Industrial Relations
25.2.1 What is Industrial Cooperation?
Cooperation is the deliberate, joint pursuit of shared interests between workers, employers and (sometimes) the state. It does not require the absence of conflict — workers and employers cooperate in producing the firm’s output even while contesting its distribution. Mature IR systems combine high cooperation with structured conflict.
25.2.2 Why Cooperation Matters
- Productivity gains that neither party could achieve alone.
- Continuity of work — strikes and lockouts are economically costly to both sides.
- Faster resolution of grievances when channels for cooperation exist.
- Innovation and adaptation — change requires worker buy-in.
- Employee well-being — recognition and voice raise satisfaction.
- Public legitimacy — IR systems seen as cooperative attract investment, talent, regulatory goodwill.
25.2.3 Pre-conditions for Cooperation
TipConditions That Enable IR Cooperation
| Condition | What it means |
|---|---|
| Mutual recognition | Each side accepts the other’s legitimacy |
| Mutual trust | Built up through repeated honest dealings |
| Information sharing | Both sides have access to the data needed to bargain meaningfully |
| Stable institutions | Recognised unions, agreed bargaining cycles, durable forums |
| Fair dispute mechanisms | Recourse when cooperation breaks down |
| Strong leadership on both sides | Negotiators with credibility within their own constituency |
| Macro-environment | Stable economy, predictable regulation, supportive political climate |
25.2.4 Forms of Cooperation
TipForms of Industrial Cooperation
| Form | What it does |
|---|---|
| Joint consultation | Sharing information and seeking views before decisions |
| Workers’ participation in management | Joint decision-making in defined areas |
| Joint productivity programmes | Shared targets and shared gains |
| Joint health and safety committees | Workplace-level cooperation on OHS |
| Quality circles | Voluntary problem-solving groups |
| Industry-level peace pacts | Long-term agreements committing both sides |
| Joint training programmes | Shared investment in skill development |
The deeper forms — workers’ participation, productivity-linked agreements, training partnerships — are the subject of chapter 26.
25.3 Bipartism
25.3.1 What is Bipartism?
Bipartism is the direct, two-party engagement between workers (or their unions) and employers (or their associations) on matters of mutual concern, without active third-party intervention. The contrast is with tripartism, where the state is also a regular participant.
TipBipartism vs Tripartism
| Dimension | Bipartism | Tripartism |
|---|---|---|
| Parties | Workers + employers | Workers + employers + state |
| Setting | Workplace, industry | National, regional, sectoral |
| Examples | Works Committee, collective bargaining | Indian Labour Conference, Standing Labour Committee |
| Strength | Closer to the issue, faster, more flexible | Brings policy weight; balances power asymmetry |
| Limit | Power imbalance can be exploited | Slower; politicised |
The two are complementary, not competing. Bipartism handles the day-to-day; tripartism shapes the policy framework within which bipartism operates.
25.3.2 Why Bipartism Matters
- Builds capability on both sides — unions and employer associations grow stronger through use.
- Speeds resolution — disputes settled at workplace level rarely escalate.
- Develops relationships — repeated bargaining produces trust over time.
- Reduces state load — fewer disputes reach tribunals.
- Owns the outcome — agreements made by the parties hold better than awards imposed by tribunals.
V.V. Giri’s case for bipartism (chapter 24) rested on these reasons; he argued that excessive state intervention atrophies the bargaining muscles that mature IR requires.
25.3.3 Indian Bipartite Forums
Several statutorily required bipartite forums exist in Indian workplaces.
TipMajor Bipartite Forums in Indian IR
| Forum | Statutory basis | Function |
|---|---|---|
| Works Committee | Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Section 3) | Mandatory in establishments with 100+ workers; promotes amity, discusses workplace issues |
| Joint Management Council | Government recommendation, 1958 | Advisory body for joint consultation in larger units |
| Shop Council | Recommended in workers’ participation schemes | Workplace-level forum |
| Plant / unit-level bargaining bodies | Recognised under collective-bargaining practice | Negotiate plant-level agreements |
| Joint Health and Safety Committees | OSH Code; Factories Act | Bipartite OHS oversight |
| Grievance Redressal Committees | ID Act (after 2010 amendment); IR Code, 2020 | Handle individual grievances |
The Works Committee is the most widely tested institution. Its mandate is “to promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the employer and workmen and, to that end, to comment on matters of common interest or concern and endeavour to compose any material difference of opinion in respect of such matters” — Section 3, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
25.3.4 Limits of Indian Bipartism
Despite a long-standing legal framework, Indian bipartism remains under-developed. Five factors are usually cited.
TipWhy Indian Bipartism Has Underperformed
| Factor | Effect |
|---|---|
| Multiplicity of unions | Several rival unions in one firm split worker voice |
| External politicisation | Unions often controlled by political parties; agendas not always workplace-aligned |
| Heavy state intervention | Compulsory adjudication has crowded out bipartism |
| Power asymmetry | Many small employer firms; large informal workforce; unions weak in services and SMEs |
| Inadequate employer associations | Weak collective representation on the employer side |
The four labour codes attempt to address some of these — encouraging recognition of negotiating unions, simplifying grievance machinery, and clarifying the bipartite-tripartite mix.
25.4 Tripartism — A Brief Recap
Tripartism, as introduced in chapter 24, brings the state into a continuing consultation with workers and employers. The standing forums — Indian Labour Conference, Standing Labour Committee, Industrial Committees, Wage Boards — operate above the bipartite layer and shape the legal-policy environment within which bipartism functions.
A working IR system uses bipartism to settle disputes and tripartism to design the rules within which disputes are settled.
25.5 Practice Questions
Eight questions to test the chapter. Each card hides the answer — click Show answer to reveal it.
Q1
Pondy's process model of conflict has
Pondy's process model of conflict has five stages, in the order:
APerceived → Felt → Manifest → Latent → Aftermath
BLatent → Perceived → Felt → Manifest → Aftermath
CLatent → Manifest → Felt → Perceived → Aftermath
DManifest → Latent → Felt → Perceived → Aftermath
Show answer
Correct answer
B. Latent → Perceived → Felt → Manifest → Aftermath.
Q2
Match the conflict-handling mode (Thomas-Kilman...
Match the conflict-handling mode (Thomas-Kilmann) with its assertiveness-cooperativeness profile:
| Mode | Profile | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| (i) | Competing | (a) | High assertiveness, high cooperativeness |
| (ii) | Collaborating | (b) | Low assertiveness, low cooperativeness |
| (iii) | Avoiding | (c) | High assertiveness, low cooperativeness |
| (iv) | Accommodating | (d) | Low assertiveness, high cooperativeness |
A(i)-(c), (ii)-(a), (iii)-(b), (iv)-(d)
B(i)-(a), (ii)-(b), (iii)-(c), (iv)-(d)
C(i)-(b), (ii)-(d), (iii)-(c), (iv)-(a)
D(i)-(d), (ii)-(c), (iii)-(a), (iv)-(b)
Show answer
Correct answer
A. (i)-(c), (ii)-(a), (iii)-(b), (iv)-(d)
Q3
Walton and McKersie's A Behavioral Theory
Walton and McKersie's A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations identified four sub-processes of bargaining. Which of the following is not one of them?
ADistributive bargaining
BIntegrative bargaining
CCompulsive bargaining
DIntra-organisational bargaining
Show answer
Correct answer
C. The four are distributive, integrative, attitudinal structuring, and intra-organisational.
Q4
A Works Committee under the Industrial
A Works Committee under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is mandatory in establishments employing:
A50 or more workers
B100 or more workers
C200 or more workers
D500 or more workers
Show answer
Correct answer
B. Section 3 of the ID Act sets the threshold at 100 workers.
Q5
Bipartism differs from tripartism primarily in
Bipartism differs from tripartism primarily in that:
ABipartism is bilingual; tripartism is trilingual
BBipartism involves only workers and employers; tripartism includes the state
CBipartism applies to public sector; tripartism to private sector
DBipartism is faster; tripartism is illegal
Show answer
Correct answer
B. The defining difference is the presence of the state as a regular party in tripartism.
Q6
Which of the following is not
Which of the following is not a manifest form of industrial conflict?
AStrike
BGo-slow
CGherao
DJoint consultation
Show answer
Correct answer
D. Joint consultation is a cooperation mechanism, not a form of conflict.
Q7
Distributive bargaining differs from integrativ...
Distributive bargaining differs from integrative bargaining in that distributive bargaining:
ATreats the pie as fixed and seeks the larger share
BExpands the pie through joint problem-solving
CIs restricted to non-economic issues
DExcludes the union from negotiations
Show answer
Correct answer
A. Distributive = win-lose splitting; integrative = win-win expansion.
Q8
Which of the following is least
Which of the following is least likely to be a precondition for sustained IR cooperation?
AMutual recognition of legitimacy
BInformation sharing between the parties
CStrong leadership on both sides
DSuppression of independent unions
Show answer
Correct answer
D. Suppressing independent unions destroys the basis for cooperation, not its precondition.
ImportantQuick recall
- Conflict in IR is normal — pluralist view treats it as inevitable.
- Functional vs dysfunctional; task / relationship / process sub-types.
- Five levels: intra-individual, inter-personal, intra-group, inter-group, inter-organisational.
- Six causes: economic, managerial, government, psychological, political, technological.
- Pondy’s five stages: Latent → Perceived → Felt → Manifest → Aftermath.
- Forms of manifest conflict: strike, lockout, go-slow, work-to-rule, gherao, boycott, picketing, sabotage, absenteeism.
- Thomas-Kilmann’s five modes: competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding, accommodating.
- Resolution menu: negotiation → conciliation → mediation → arbitration → adjudication.
- Walton-McKersie’s four sub-processes: distributive, integrative, attitudinal structuring, intra-organisational.
- Cooperation pre-conditions: mutual recognition + trust + information sharing + stable institutions + fair dispute mechanisms + strong leadership + supportive macro-environment.
- Forms of cooperation: joint consultation, workers’ participation, productivity programmes, OHS committees, quality circles, peace pacts, training partnerships.
- Bipartism = workers + employers; tripartism = + state.
- Indian bipartite forums: Works Committee (ID Act §3, 100+ workers), Joint Management Council, Shop Council, plant-level bargaining, OHS committees, Grievance Redressal Committees.
- Limits of Indian bipartism: multiplicity of unions, politicisation, heavy state intervention, power asymmetry, weak employer associations.